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Arab States

1. All of the Arab States except Saudi Arabia will probably exhibit an increasingly neutralist position in the East-West conflict. Their dominant attitude will remain ~~self-interest~~ ^{self-interest}, viewing the East-West conflict as a matter of ~~no real~~ ^{less urgent} concern, and seeking primarily to obtain Western, especially US, assistance ~~that can be employed against Israel.~~ ^{in developing their military position vis-a-vis Israel and US} ~~Increasing~~ ^{assistance} instability in Iraq and growing nationalist influence in Jordan may make the attitudes of these countries ^{more as a result} ~~particularly~~ unfavorable to cooperation with the West.

"2 concern",
assistance
is pushing
the WK from
its dominant
position in
the area.

2. All of the Arab States, in varying degree, desire to increase their own defense efforts, though for entirely different purposes than that of defense in connection with possible East-West conflict. Their major purposes are, ~~first~~ ^{second}, defense against Israel and if possible arms superiority to Israel, and, ~~second~~ ^{first}, internal military security to maintain existing regimes in power. Egypt and Syria, particularly, as military regimes, will desire to secure a build-up of their military forces for prestige purposes. In Egypt, particularly, and on a descending scale in other countries, the price of cooperation in a MEDO

Arab States (~~including Libya~~)

1. All of the Arab States except Saudi Arabia will probably exhibit an increasingly neutralist position in the East-West conflict. Their dominant attitude will remain ^(primarily) selfish, viewing the East-West conflict as a matter of ^(quick) ~~no real~~ ^(to them) concern and seeking primarily to obtain Western, especially US, assistance that can be employed against Israel. Increasing instability in Iraq and growing nationalist influence in Jordan may make the attitudes of these countries particularly unfavorable to cooperation with the West.

AF - come from West feeling not selfish. (Napib.)

2. All of the Arab States, in varying degree, desire to increase their own defense efforts, [though for entirely different purposes than that of defense in connection with possible East-West conflict]. ^{for} Their major purposes, are, ^{second, of} first, defense against Israel and if possible arms superiority to Israel, and, ^{first, of} second, internal military security to maintain existing regimes in power, ^{and} Egypt and Syria, particularly, as military regimes, will desire to secure a build-up of their military forces for prestige purposes. In Egypt, particularly, and on a descending scale in other countries, the price of cooperation in a MEDO

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Arab States

1. All of the Arab States except Saudi Arabia will probably exhibit an increasingly neutralist position in the East-West conflict. Motivated primarily by self interest, they will not view the East-West conflict as a matter of major concern. They will, however, seek to obtain Western, especially U.S. assistance as a means to become independent of British influence and to strengthen their military position vis-a-vis Israel. Possible political unrest in Iraq, growing nationalism in Jordan, and lack of a solution to the Saudi Arabian-British dispute over boundaries in the Persian Gulf area will make these countries less willing to cooperate with the West.

Their major purposes are, first, to strengthen internal military security to maintain existing regimes in power, and second, to increase their defense capability against Israel and if possible attain arms superiority over Israel. Egypt and Syria, particularly, as military regimes, will desire to secure a build-up of their military forces for prestige purposes. In Egypt, particularly, and on a descending scale in other countries, the price of cooperation in a MEDO will be treatment as an equal with other participants and military assistance.

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will be increased local military build-up. There is most unlikely to be any real sense of urgency, or any relaxation of opposition to a commitment for action in the event of war.

3. Hostility to Western bases is almost certain to increase, with the Arab States seeking either (a) to eliminate Western bases and troops from their territory

DELETE

or war, or (b) to extract from the West the highest possible price for facilities granted in order to compensate for real or imagined risks in so doing.

DELETE -- CONTRARY TO FACT

DELETE (FOREGOING APPLIES TO IRAQ, NO NEED TO SINGLE THAT COUNTRY OUT) would ~~not accept the stationing of foreign ground troops~~

4. These basic attitudes would, of course, be seriously affected in the event of a Communist take-over in Iran. Prompt and effective Western counteraction might produce a solidifying effect in the Middle East, but in the absence of such action the reaction of the Arab States would be extremely unfavorable, and there probably would be an overwhelming demand for the abrogation of all Western base rights and for negotiation, if necessary, with the USSR.

as well as basic political assumptions
will be increased local military build-up. There is most unlikely to be any real sense of urgency, or any ~~relaxation of opposition~~ *to a commitment for action* in the event of war. *misleading the situation of the Arab states in Egypt*

3. Hostility to Western bases is almost certain to increase, with the Arab States seeking either (a) to eliminate Western bases and troops from their territory *in the belief that this will* *enable them to maintain neutrality and lessen the attraction* preserve them from Soviet attack in the event of war, or (b) to extract from the West the highest possible price for facilities granted in order to compensate for real or imagined risks in so doing. Iraq may be as strongly opposed as the rest to bases and would almost certainly not accept the stationing of foreign ground troops. *OK. freedom of choice*

4. These basic attitudes would, of course, be seriously affected in the event of a Communist take-over in Iran. *particularly if the Soviets play a major role* Prompt and effective Western counteraction might produce a solidifying effect in the Middle East, but in the absence of such action the reaction of the Arab States would be extremely unfavorable, and there probably would be an overwhelming demand for the abrogation of all Western base rights and for negotiation, if necessary, with the USSR. *OK. probably*

*in seeking not the elimination of
hostile bases, but a higher price for
maintaining them.*

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4. These basic attitudes would, of course, be seriously affected in the event of a Communist take-over in Iran. The Arab States would be greatly impressed by prompt and effective Western counter-action, and as a result they would be more inclined to cooperate with the West, particularly if the Communist action in Iran involved use of Soviet forces and thus pointed up the impending Soviet threat to the adjacent area. In the absence of such action, however, the reaction of the Arab States would be extremely unfavorable, and there probably would be an overwhelming demand for the abrogation of all Western base rights and for negotiation, if necessary, with the USSR.

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5. In the economic field, Egyptian cotton trade with the USSR will probably increase, and some trans-shipment of strategic goods through Lebanon will continue despite moderate Lebanese cooperation with East-West restrictions. The Arab States will probably continue to support shipment of petroleum to the West, though there may be increasing pressures for boycott against Western nations that, in Arab eyes, extend favors to Israel, such as West Germany in the recent restitution agreement.

6. The Arabs will almost certainly remain highly indifferent to the Korean War, and to Western political warfare moves throughout the world. ^P In the UN, there may be a serious further deterioration in the Arab position vis-a-vis the West, to the point of the Arab States abstaining on basic East-West issues. Such a change would be likely if the recent vote of the USSR on the Arab-Israeli conflict should set a pattern and/or if the US should continue to take an attitude interpreted by the Arab States as siding with the "imperial powers" and Israel.

7. Though the Arab States would be unlikely themselves to enter into any broad negotiations with the USSR, they would welcome any negotiations that appeared to promise a detente which would minimize the threat of a world conflict with the Near East

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as a likely battlefield. However, to the extent that negotiations appeared to indicate any Western weakness or dealing at the expense of small nations, the Arab reaction would be unfavorable to the West.

8. In propaganda, stronger Soviet stress on an anti-Zionist line might have some effect, but outright anti-Semitism might backfire in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan because of the mixed religious character of these countries and the feeling of rival religious or economic groups that their turn might be next. However, the Arab States would be markedly susceptible to Soviet Bloc tactics designed to show the USSR as the prime major power support against colonialism, "imperialist" encroachments and Israeli aims. In narrower concrete terms, the Arab States would be receptive to Soviet offers to take Egyptian cotton or to Soviet offers to supply arms, if the Western powers had failed to do so, and such traffic might further diminish cooperation with the West.

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as a likely battlefield. However, to the extent that negotiations appeared to indicate ~~any Western weakness or dealing at the expense of small nations~~ *signal the Arab states to ally with the West or*, the Arab reaction would be unfavorable.

The current East-West conflict is viewed as giving the Arab states to the West. a certain bargaining position in speaking to the West.

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-none is
needed.
clarify for
AP.

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Libya

1. Like the Arab States, Libya is likely to remain predominantly selfish and aloof from the East-West conflict. With respect to bases, its attitude will differ from that of the Arab States in that it will seek not the elimination of Western bases but simply a higher price for granting them. For this purpose Libya will continue to serve as a counterweight to British and French influence.

2. For the present the local Communist Party has been destroyed by the deportation of its leaders. There might, however, be a resurgence of extremist feeling, lending itself to Communism, if nationalist ambitions were frustrated or Tripolitanian desires for a greater share in the government completely thwarted.

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Stats

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Libya will ~~continue to~~ seek to use the US as a counterweight to

^{particularly Egypt} British influence ^{or vice versa} ~~and to use its ties with the Arab states~~ ^{increasingly close} as a bargaining element.

2. For the present the local Communist ^{group} ~~Party~~ ^{-- mainly supported by more than a handful of Libyans --} has been ^{weakened} ~~badly~~ ^{destroyed} by the deportation of its leaders. There might, however, be a resurgence of extremist feeling, ^{which might be capitalized upon by} ~~leading itself to~~ Communism, if nationalist ambitions were frustrated or Tripolitanian desires for a greater share in the government completely thwarted.

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Ethiopia

1. So long as he lives, the present Emperor is likely to remain in complete control in Ethiopia, and to cooperate with the West. His death might produce a period of uncertainty and a gradual change of attitude, but there is no likelihood that this would result in any change in the status of the Asmara station during the period of this estimate. Internally, there is no Communist Party, although there has been some isolated Soviet propaganda against which the government has taken no effective measures. It does not appear likely that Communist influence could become important during the period of this estimate.

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
Ethiopia

1. So long as he lives, the present Emperor is likely to remain in complete control in Ethiopia, and to cooperate with the West. This pro-Western attitude is indicated by the Emperor's strong advocacy of collective security and his recently announced assertion that Ethiopia would favor joining a Middle East defense organization. His death might produce a period of uncertainty and a gradual change of attitude, but there is no likelihood that this would result in any change in the status of the Asmara station during the period of this estimate. Internally, there is no Communist Party, although there has been some isolated Soviet propaganda against which the government has taken no effective measures. It does not appear likely that Communist influence could become important during the period of this estimate.

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French North Africa

Note. This section deals solely with native attitudes in this area. Local French attitudes are assumed to be generally similar to those of metropolitan France.

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1. The popular attitude in French North Africa will be one of increasing neutralism in the East-West conflict. This is partly *leverage deriving themselves from the conflict with the French state* because the people see no direct ~~stake in the conflict~~, and partly to establish a bargaining position to give them some additional leverage in dealing with the West. Insofar as there is likely to be a general underlying sympathy, it will probably be pro-Western.
 2. Although the people of North Africa are favorable on the surface to the presence of Western defense bases, especially the US air bases, their attitude is motivated largely by self-*(primarily for nationalist considerations)* interest, and is adversely influenced by such factors as job discrimination against natives and disregard of local rulers, as in the case of the French-directed failure to consult the Moroccan Sultan on the base agreements there. Resentment for such causes is unlikely to reach serious proportions within the period of this estimate, although it may increase markedly if

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1. The popular attitude in French North Africa will be one of increasing neutralism in the East-West conflict. This is partly because the people see no direct stake in the conflict, and partly to establish a bargaining position to give them some additional leverage in dealing with the West. Insofar as there is likely to be a general underlying sympathy, it will probably be pro-Western.

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State

the US position on North African and colonial issues causes ^{dis-}illusionment toward the US, which now appears to some degree still as a North African champion.

3. Despite the prevalent unrest, the Communist organization has generally not been strong enough to take advantage of, or contribute substantially to, anti-Western activity. The French ^{recently} have taken firm action against Communist and Nationalist activity ^{as at times in the past} and might conceivably be tempted to permit a measure of Communist activity while attacking the Nationalists more strongly.)

4. North African popular sentiment is opposed to French activity looking toward European integration and North African inclusion in ^{the} ~~its~~ framework. This is regarded in North Africa as a device to fortify the French position and as simply another form of French exploitation.

Union of South Africa

See NIE-72, "Probable Developments in the Union of South Africa," 20 October 1952, especially paragraphs 37-42.

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Spoke of the Serfism
7 Black Africa (i.e., not including French North Africa, the Union of South Africa, or Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.)

1. The attitudes of Europeans in these areas generally correspond to attitudes in their home countries. Among the natives, the emerging nationalists consider the East-West conflict entirely secondary to their own struggle. There will continue to be some initial predisposition to look favorably on the USSR as a champion of colonial freedom, and this feeling may increase if the USSR adopts a position in the UN favoring the Arab-Asian bloc on such issues. Toward the West, there is some friction in areas where development of raw material sources has been carried on without regard for *the dislocation of the local economy and traditional social organization.* ~~local feeling.~~

2. Although there is considerable potential vulnerability to Communist activity, Communist exploitation has had only limited effect, partly because of anti-Communist measures taken by the colonial powers. There is little danger of substantial Communist gain within the period of this estimate, but the situation may deteriorate beyond that time.

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